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 focus on a set of issues that most people find vitally important, but which 
have not got much attention in the philosophical literature: what it is for life to be meaningful. The 
Wolf volume is a collective effort: two substantial lectures by Wolf, followed by comments from 
John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly, and Jonathan Haidt, and Wolf’s response to those 
remarks (not to mention a brief but informative introduction by Stephen Macedo).  It elegantly 
displays philosophy in action, the commentators taking up or criticising elements in Wolf’s original 
lectures and her trying to accommodate or revise her position in their light. Thagard’s is a deliberate 
popularisation of a comprehensive atheist naturalism that emphasises a third radical revolution in 
our picture of ourselves after Copernicus displaced us from the centre of things and Darwin put us 
firmly among the millions of other evolving species of living things: what he calls ‘the Brain 
Revolution,’ the recognition that what we are, our selves or minds (‘soul’ is clearly no longer 
needed) is simply what our brains do, not a ‘thing’ of any sort. He indicates what the picture 
involves and sketches some of the supporting argument, but here he merely gives references
2
 to the 
more detailed philosophical work that would be needed to defend it and to argue for the rejection of 
necessity, possible worlds, supervenience, propositional attitudes, thought experiments, or 
conceptual analysis that is a part of the package he would urge upon us. Thagard structures his 
discussion around the popular suspicion that such a scientifically based world view entails that life 
has no meaning. Chapter 1 begins with Camus’ idea that the only serious philosophical question is 
why not commit suicide; chapter 7 reminds us that Camus didn’t take his own life, and goes on to 
tell us why life is worth living. So while there is much on knowledge and on neuropsychology, it is 
fair to see Thagard as centrally trying to address the issue of meaningfulness. 
                                                 
1 Susan Wolf et al., Meaning in Life and Why it Matters, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. xvi + 143, 
and Paul Thagard, The Brain and the Meaning of Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. xv + 274. 
This is definitely a partial review since I shall say nothing about Thagard’s chapters on why basing beliefs, in 
medicine and elsewhere, on evidence rather than tradition is a good thing, on knowledge, perception, concepts, 
emotions, or decision-making. 
2 In a curious style. There are no indications of footnotes or endnotes in the text, but at the end there is a set of 
references and comments keyed to phrases and authors, so one can usually follow up the claims he makes. 
Susan Wolf starts by rejecting one of philosophy’s major binary oppositions: self-interest 
versus the moral impartial concern for all. She insists that many of the reasons and motives we 
actually have and which give meaning to our lives do not fit either of these types of justification. 
Love for a person or for an activity generates action that is neither self-interested nor necessarily 
required by morality. While not self-interested, she thinks that typically it leads to enjoyment or 
subjective satisfaction. But, and here we see an element that Wolf wishes to stress, love can go 
wrong, it can be mistaken or misplaced: she demands some sort of objective worth in what is loved. 
Wolf glances at the popular ‘self-help’ literature on meaningfulness and sees in it two 
opposing tendencies: go for what turns you on, and go for something larger than your own pre-
occupations. In trying to combine these Wolf suggests that the second is stressing independence 
from narrow self-interest rather than the sheer size of whatever one commits to. And, once again, it 
reflects a concern for the objective worth of the activity. Our paradigms of meaningful lives (she 
suggests Gandhi or Mother Theresa, or Einstein, or Cézanne, definitely not Sisyphus, even if, 
perhaps especially if, he were drugged to think pushing stones the most satisfying activity in the 
universe) reveal a concern for certain activities and a ruling out of possible others. As she neatly 
puts it, “meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness” (p. 62).  
Wolf and her commentators explore some of the ramifications of this approach: there are 
difficult questions about the extent to which the success of a person’s projects counts in estimating 
the meaningfulness of their life (Koethe in particular discusses some cases on the borders of 
delusion, and suggests that there will be unavoidable indeterminacies in these kinds of judgment) 
and questions about whose judgments should prevail and when they should best be made. But 
perhaps the main issue Wolf argues for and which some at least of her commentators query is the 
demand for objectivity, for being able to say in a strong sense that a person could be making a 
mistake in these matters. It is an uncomfortable position since on the one hand she admits that she 
hasn’t got an acceptable account of what such objectivity amounts to (p. 45) but she thinks that it is 
vital that there is some objective content to the thought; “[i]f there is no such thing as (the relevant 
kind of) objective value, or if talk of distinctions in worth is nonsensical, then meaning in life ... is 
impossible” (p. 35) and she fears that if we cannot fully understand meaningfulness we might lose 
our interest in it (p. 63). 
Haidt and Arpaly (and Thagard, I suspect) do not see this problem. They point out that the 
kinds of egregious error Wolf mentioned (one of her cases is of a woman whose total fulfilment 
consists in her relationship with a goldfish) simply do not occur, and if they did would reveal simple 
errors of a purely factual kind (goldfish do not communicate with humans) rather than a mistake 
about a normative issue.
3
 Haidt and Arpaly both appeal to the psychology of typical humans to 
generate what we find unproblematic or curious attachments, Thagard gets down to the complex 
circuits in the brain for much the same point: this is how humans are wired, these are the things we 
like or dislike – why ask for some extra endorsement by way of the objectivity of our norms? 
Wolf is unwilling to follow. She rejects a privileging of the normal or typical and equally of the 
natural. We might find that belligerence is part of our nature; does that condone it? She is also open 
to talk of transcending our nature so wishes to leave open the possibility of that as a meaningful 
way of life. Thagard, in his eighth chapter, invokes David Wiggins’ “vital needs” as a framework for 
finding norms in the nature of things, too easily to my mind, since once we get beyond oxygen and 
water Thagard’s own examples of ascetic diminution of wants show that human lives can persist 
under such conditions and so his preferred non-ascetic is unable to claim that her life would be 
impossible under that regime.
4
 But he also invokes the idea of decision making as inference to the 
best plan, where such inference should be responsive to a wide range of relevant considerations.  
Once we get such reflection on to the scene, I do not see why we could not conclude that a naturally 
given disposition, to belligerence, say, is something we should make every effort to curb, given 
other naturally occurring aims that we have. Whatever transcending our nature may be, if anyone 
can actually do it, then it is a natural potentiality after all, and so might have some appeal to some 
                                                 
3 Arpaly notes that caring for a goldfish might well provide meaning for a severely handicapped child. 
4 I have commented on the difficulties of building on the notion of needs in a couple of earlier papers: Review of 
Soran Reader (ed.) The Philosophy of Need. Shibboleths: Journal of Comparative Theory 1 (2), 129-133, 2007, and 
The Philosophy of Need, Round 3 . Shibboleths: Journal of Comparative Theory 3 (1) 1-7, 2008. 
people. The plasticity of human potentiality forces choice upon us (or ‘choice’ such as we face with 
respect to the language we use), in a way that most other animals avoid. I suspect that neither Wolf 
nor Thagard want to admit that much openness.
5
 
Wolf’s rich volume is eminently sensible and sensitive and makes a significant contribution 
to clearer thinking about an important question. Thagard presents an attractive position, but in an 
avowedly popularising manner, so there is not much here to sway philosophers dealing with these 
issues. I think he is right to say that shifting people from a substantive self/mind/soul to thinking of 
what the body or brain gets up to is one of the big issues for our self-understanding, but he has not 
here provided a dissolution of the problem of the nature of consciousness that leads some to bizarre 
extremes such as panpsychism, so it is in the end little more than the suggestion that it has got to be 
this way somehow, however impossible it might be to conceive it clearly.
6
 Wolf and her 
commentators acknowledge the danger of seeing their parochial concerns as underwritten by the 
nature of things (she sketches an unusual fallibilist view of normative knowledge), and while she 
offers examples of prima facie worthwhile and meaningless pursuits, and paradigm cases of 
meaningful lives, she insists that she isn’t going to specify for us what we should do to have such a 
life.  
Thagard on the other hand believes that neuropsychology, if not common observation, 
reveals that humans find satisfaction in three main areas (love, work, and play, all pretty broadly 
interpreted, though work is unalienated in Marx’s sense, not the drudgery so many have to endure). 
He gestures at showing how these satisfactions connect with our supposed vital needs for 
competence, relatedness and autonomy (in chapter 8). I am afraid Thagard seems a little less 
sensitive to the real world around him, at least beyond his Canadian borders. Love, work, and play 
may constitute most of what makes his life meaningful, but it has been a comfortable middle-class 
life in academia, not exactly a world norm. A danger for naturalistic approaches to the normative is 
                                                 
5 I have commented at greater length on Wolf’s worry about objectivity in ‘Does Objectivity Matter for the 
Meaningfulness of Life?’ read at the 6th Cave Hill Philosophy Symposium, November 19th, 2010. 
6 At one point, he says: “[t]he best response to people who say that they just can’t imagine how the mind could be the 
brain is: try harder” (p. 61). 
a crude equation of what is liked (or done more broadly) with what ought to be liked (the sort of 
confusion often attributed to J.S. Mill). Despite having the resources to avoid this, I think Thagard 
comes over too often as endorsing it: it is not true life has no meaning because most people are 
happy (p. 145); “[l]ooking at the countries on both lists [the top of the UN Human Development 
Index and surveys of subjective well-being: Iceland, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland], we might reasonably conjecture that the currently available form of government most 
conducive to satisfaction of human needs consists of a liberal democracy operating in a capitalist 
economic system with substantial state support for education, health care, and other egalitarian 
social requirements” (p. 217). He recognises the inappropriateness of including religion and 
spirituality in his list of desirable items, despite their role in the lives of the majority of human 
beings (pp. 180-181), but he is a little too confident about some of the others: cannibalism is 
obviously wrong, as is homophobia, but might voluntary polygamy squeeze in (p. 203)? 
As befits work dealing with what makes life worth living, both books give us more than 
straight philosophy. Wolf directs us to a recipe for chocolate cake (p. 51, usefully in the index), and 
Thagard recounts several jokes, gives us a guide to making bad decisions (pp. 133-136), and offers 
the fantasy of being “in Tahiti ... caressed by a native who is feeding you breadfruit” (p. 124, not in 
the index) – for those of us lucky enough to be able to have breadfruit growing in the back garden, 
that is about on par with a Tahitian dreaming of being caressed by a blonde Swedish beauty while 
being spoon-fed potatoes.  To each his own. 
